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Working Towards Justice for All:
Strengthening the Apprehension Mechanism of
the International Criminal Court
John Griffith1
On February 26, 2003, a group known as the Darfur Liberation
Front took credit for an attack in Golo, a rural district in the Darfur
region of Western Sudan, thus initiating the present conflict in Darfur. Since that time, a reported 300,000 lives have been lost and an
additional two million people have been displaced as a result of the
fighting there.2 In June of 2005, President George W. Bush described
the killings in Darfur as genocide.3 As of July 12, 2010, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued two arrest warrants for Suda-
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Darfur: Ban Voices Sadness at Death of UN-African Peacekeeper Wounded in July (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp/html/
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nese President Omar al-Bashir.4 In the arrest warrants, the ICC—a
permanent tribunal tasked with investigating and prosecuting genocide, war crimes, the crime of aggression, and crimes against humanity—formally accused al-Bashir of five counts of crimes against
humanity, two counts of war crimes, and three counts of genocide.
A case such as this necessarily begs the following question: who
is responsible for arresting a head of state? Though the ICC has been
given assent by the international community to charge and prosecute individuals—even heads of state5—for the crimes enumerated
above, the Court lacks any power of apprehension. For an individual
to be prosecuted by the ICC he or she must first be delivered to the
Court by an independent third party or arrive by his or her own
choice. This makes the situation very difficult to resolve when the individual in question is the president of a country. These restrictions
allow al-Bashir to remain free while the crisis in Darfur persists.
The international community’s failure to arrest the President of
Sudan is just one of many possible cases that demonstrate how the
restrictions placed upon the ICC often make justice an unreachable
goal. The limitations on the ability of the ICC to physically apprehend a suspected criminal are in place for the purpose of protecting
states’ sovereignty. Yet while sovereignty is an important right of
each state, it is not so sacred as to justify permitting war criminals
and those committing genocide to continue such acts uninhibited.
For this reason, a change must be made in the operational powers of
the ICC.
It should be noted that the International Criminal Court operates
by the consent of its member states, also known as States Party to the
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Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09,
Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (International Criminal Court Mar. 3, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.
pdf. see also Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No.
ICC-02/05-01/09, Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir (International Criminal Court Mar. 3, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/doc/doc907140.pdf.
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Rome Statute.6 For this reason, any action to make the ICC autonomous and therefore no longer constrained by a state’s sovereignty
would be futile, as no country would agree to give up its sovereignty
to the ICC. However, refusal to abdicate sovereignty does not mean
that a solution to this problem cannot be found.
In order to demonstrate how this situation may be rectified, it
is important to understand the issues at play. Accordingly, I will
first briefly examine the evolution and background of sovereignty,
the limitations it places upon the ICC and its current implications
for global, intergovernmental bodies like the United Nations. I will
then discuss notable historical criminal tribunals and the legal concerns they raised. Following this, I will examine cases that illustrate the ability of the United Nations Security Council to overcome
a state’s sovereignty in response to international conflicts. Finally,
I will propose a system whereby the International Criminal Court
may petition the United Nations Security Council to take action in
apprehending those whose crimes are considered to be outstanding.
In so doing, I will discuss the relationship between the International
Criminal Court and the United Nations Security Council in order
to demonstrate the viability of the proposed system. By examining
the relationship between these two bodies and the treaties that bind
them, I will show how a petitioner-petitionee relationship can exist
between the Court and the Security Council and how such an arrangement stands to resolve many of the impediments to justice that
currently plague the Court.

I. Sovereignty
The current idea of sovereignty has its origins in the 1648 Peace
of Westphalia. From the Peace of Westphalia comes the term Westphalian sovereignty, which espouses the belief that a nation-state
should have control over its own affairs. Under this system, a na6

Henceforth, States Party to the Rome Statute will be referred to as ‘signatories’ to ease understanding. However, it should be noted that not all
states that have signed the Rome Statute are States Parties. The United
States, for example, signed the treaty but did not ratify it, therefore precluding it from membership in the ICC.
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tion’s head of state, or sovereign, is in charge of its territorial integrity instead of a separate foreign agent.
Along with sovereignty and the freedom to determine one’s own
political fate came the idea of legal equality among states. Unique to
this belief was the idea that rather than any one empire having preeminence over another, individual states ought to hold the same legal
standing as one another. Strengthening states’ legal rights also led
to an implicit discouragement of foreign intervention in a state’s domestic affairs. Adopting the tenets of Westphalian sovereignty leads
to a more insular world—one where what happens within a state’s
borders is, for the most part, that state’s right and duty to resolve of
its own accord. This philosophy has become the backbone of modern
international treaty law.
The founding principles in the creation of the United Nations
in 1945 reinforced the international community’s commitment to
Westphalian thinking. The ratification of the Charter of the United
Nations showed that Westphalian sovereignty was respected by the
international community, despite having been tested by the imposition of new laws that foreign powers enforced during the criminal
tribunals following the Second World War. Though the mission of
the UN was to bring about global peace through international agreement, cooperation, and understanding, its charter is still surprisingly
blatant in its deference to the traditional notions of Westphalian sovereignty. In the second Article the United Nations Charter makes it
clear that the body intends to operate with full respect to the sovereignty of its Member States, verifying, “The Organization is based
on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”7 Further support is lent to states’ sovereignty by the fourth paragraph
of the same article, wherein it states, “All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”8
These statements clearly illustrate that the UN seeks to uphold and
respect the sovereignty of its Member States.
7

U.N. Charter art. 2 para. 1.

8

Id. at para. 4.
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Additional deference to sovereignty can be found in the seventh
paragraph of the second Article of the Charter, which says, “Nothing
contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
Chapter VII.”9 This final section is important not only for its evident respect for sovereignty, but also for the caveat listed at the end,
which will be discussed later. Nonetheless, the opening sentences
of the Charter clearly show that the principles of sovereignty first
enacted as a result of the Peace of Westphalia were foundational to
the United Nations Charter.
The Rome Statute—the founding document of the International
Criminal Court—like the United Nations Charter, includes reservations to prevent the Court from infringing upon a state’s sovereignty.
For example, the Preamble states that it is:
Reaffirming the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of
the United Nations, and in particular that all States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations, [and]
Emphasizing in this connection that nothing in this Statute
shall be taken as authorizing any State Party to intervene
in an armed conflict or in the internal affairs of any State.10
Though the wording is less explicit than that of the United Nations
Charter, the limitations written into the Rome Statute are nonetheless effective in their assurance of the rights historically afforded to
sovereign states.

9

Id. at para. 7.

10

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S 3, pmbl.
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One way that the ICC respects sovereignty is explained in Article 4, paragraph 2, which limits the jurisdiction of the Court to
signatories of the Rome Statute. However, an exception is made for
those territories that are not signatories if they first agree to be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. Essentially, this limits the ICC to
prosecute only those suspected of having committed genocide, war
crimes, or crimes against humanity in countries that first agree to
the terms of the statute. Furthermore, Article 17 declares that cases
are inadmissible before the ICC if the state that has jurisdiction over
that crime is taking or has taken action towards the prosecution of
said crime.
Perhaps the greatest surrendering of ICC power by the Rome
Statute to honor sovereignty is found in Part 9—International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance. This section establishes that the
Court must rely on others to do the work that must take place before
any trial is to happen. For example Article 89, Paragraph 1 states
that, “The Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person, together with the material supporting the request
outlined in Article 91, to any State on the territory of which that person may be found and shall request the cooperation of that State in
the arrest and surrender of such a person.”11 Such language demonstrates the inability of the Court to perform any duty that takes place
within a state. It must necessarily rely on the state that plays host
to the accused to apprehend and deliver the individual before the
Court. Only then may the Court exercise any real authority. Should
a state decide not to participate, the Court is severely lacking in its
ability to respond because it wields no power to override that state’s
sovereignty. Consequently, the Court has virtually no power to act
against recalcitrant states. In the words of the Pre-Trial Chamber of
the ICC, “‘the ICC has no enforcement mechanism and thus relies on

11

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S 3, art. 89 para. 1.
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the States’ cooperation, without which it cannot fulfill its mandate
and contribute to ending impunity.’”12
Clearly, the effects of the Peace of Westphalia are an integral
part of modern international law. The tenets of state sovereignty laid
out over three centuries ago live on in the foundational documents
of some of the foremost international institutions. While this has
certainly done much good in preserving the freedoms of smaller
nations, unbending adherence to these notions of sovereignty also
comes at a price. Specifically, the efficacy of international bodies
whose purpose is to protect the weak and bring justice to those who
would do them harm—most notably, the ICC—has been inhibited
by its inability to overcome states’ Westphalian rights.

II. Historical Tribunals
Over the years, there have been many international tribunals
convened in order to address a wide array of legal violations. Some
of the most famous and recent were the military tribunals established
by the Allied Forces after World War II to bring to justice those responsible for the atrocities committed by the Nazis and the Empire
of Japan. If the efficacy of these tribunals were measured solely by
the number and prominence of the condemned that received punishment, then there would be no need to devise a new system. However,
the backlash against the structure and methods of these tribunals
highlighted the need for an independent international court to deal
with violations of universally agreed upon human rights laws.
Perhaps the best known of these tribunals were the Nuremburg
Trials. Convened in November 1945, the Nuremburg Trials sought
to punish prominent members of the Nazi Party for the war crimes
and crimes against humanity perpetrated before and during the hostilities. In these proceedings, the accused stood trial before a court
whose judges and prosecutors were made up of representatives of
the Allied Powers—specifically the United States, the United King12

Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Eighteenth Report of the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), ¶ 16 (Dec. 11, 2013) http://www.
icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-UNSC-Darfur-Speech-Dec-2013-Eng.pdf.

90

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 28, 2014

dom, France, and the Soviet Union—while the defendants were represented in large part by German lawyers. Of the twenty-four major
war criminals indicted, twelve were sentenced to death by hanging.13
Yet many at the time, and since, took issue with the proceedings
in Nuremburg. Shortly after the conclusion of the Nuremburg trials,
Quincy Wright asked:
How can principles enunciated by the Nuremberg Tribunal,
to take it as an example, be of legal value until most of the
states have agreed to a tribunal with jurisdiction to enforce
those principles? How could the Nuremberg Tribunal have
obtained jurisdiction to find Germany guilty of aggression,
when Germany had not consented to the Tribunal? How
could the law, first explicitly accepted in the Nuremberg
Charter of 1945, have bound the defendants in the trial when
they committed the acts for which they were indicted years
earlier?14
The questions raised here point to a possible lack of respect for the
sovereignty of the state of Germany. That is, rather than allow Germany to prosecute the suspected war criminals on its own, the Allied
Powers overrode its autonomy and exerted their own justice on the
accused. When it comes to regarding a state’s apparent rights to sovereignty, it would appear that the Nuremberg International Military
Tribunal overstepped its bounds.
Like that in Nuremburg, a military tribunal was also held in Japan in order to prosecute those believed to be responsible for Japan’s role in the hostilities. The International Military Tribunal for
the Far East (commonly known as the Tokyo Trials) was convened
in April 1946 by order of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme
Allied Commander. The Tribunal would operate as directed under
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
13

Letter from Whitney R. Harris, Representative for Robert H. Jackson, C.J.
U.S. S. Ct., to Robert H. Jackson, C.J. U.S. S. Ct., (Oct. 15, 1946), http://
law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/nurembergexecutions.
html.

14

Quincy Wright, Legal Positivism and the Nuremberg Judgment, 2 Am. J.
Int’l L. 42, 406-407 (1948).
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(CIMTFE), which was modeled after that of the Nuremburg tribunal.
Like the Charter of the International Military Tribunal that bound
the Nuremburg Trials, the CIMTFE laid out three offences for which
individuals could be charged: crimes against peace, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity. Like their counterpart at Nuremburg, the
Tokyo Trials were not without similar criticism. It is worth noting
that Japan did not formally accept the judgments of the Tokyo Trials
until 1951.15
When discussing the Nuremburg and the Tokyo Trials, the issue
of sovereignty must be considered. Specifically, one may ask what
right the Allied Powers had to violate the sovereignty of the states of
Japan and Germany and convene their own tribunals in accordance
with their own perceptions of the law. Ultimately, the answer is that
the authority to override these states’ sovereignty was not given,
but was taken. Because each nation had been involved in a war and
lost, German and Japanese sovereignty was nonexistent. Instead, the
countries were run by the victors—the Allied Powers.
After the cessation of hostilities in Germany and Japan, arrangements were made whereby the countries might be administered during the period of postwar reconstruction. Two bodies were
created—the Allied Control Council and the Allied Council for Japan—in order to oversee the postwar efforts in Germany and Japan,
respectively. These councils were overseen by the European Advisory Commission and the Far East Commission, two organizations
formed as a result of diplomatic conferences held to determine the
fate of the Axis powers. Although there was significant debate regarding control of these countries after the war, ultimately neither
Germany nor Japan enjoyed the privileges of a sovereign state.
Germany’s lack of sovereignty can be seen in the wording of
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal that gave jurisdiction to the Nuremburg Trials. Section II, Article 6 lays out the
various crimes for which the accused could be charged at Nuremburg. For example, crimes against humanity are defined as “murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
15

Treaty of Peace with Japan Allied Forces-Japan, Ch. 4 art. 11, Sep. 8,
1952, http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm.
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committed against any civilian population, before or during the war;
or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution
of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country
where perpetrated.”16 The final statement that individuals would be
held responsible despite the legality of their actions under the laws
of the state where they took place is a clear blow to the sovereignty
of the laws of that state. The message seems to be that not all states
are legally equal, or at least that the laws of some states trump those
of others, despite the actions being committed and the trial thereof
taking place in those subsidiary states. In other words, these tribunals were conducted irrespective of the laws of the other nations that
were essentially denied their sovereign power to control the affairs
within their borders.
After examination of the Nuremburg and Tokyo Trials, it becomes apparent that, despite the usual reliance upon, and deference
to, states’ rights to sovereignty, historical examples do exist where
one state exerts control over the political and legal affairs of another—even applying prosecutorial power to ex post facto laws17—with
relative acceptance from the global community. Still, these tribunals
were undoubtedly held under special circumstances. Consequently,
it must be determined whether these unique circumstances are an
exception or if one could rely upon the legal framework and precedent already in place as a basis for further circumvention of state
sovereignty.

16

International Military Tribunal Charter - Annex to the Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, U.N.

17

Compare Letter from Dr. Stahmer, All Defense Counsel Ger., to Nuremberg Trial Tribunal, (Nov. 19, 1945), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/v1-30.
asp (leveling allegations of applying ex post facto laws), with Letter from
Nuremberg Trial Tribunal, Allied Forces, to Dr. Stahmer, All Defense
Counsel Ger., (Nov. 21, 1945), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judlawch.
asp (rejecting those allegations and ruling that insofar as it was a plea
to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal it was in conflict with Article 3 of the
Charter).
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III. The United Nations’ Ability to Override Sovereignty
The United Nations Security Council has the ability to override a country’s sovereignty if the necessary vote count is attained.
To pass a resolution, the Security Council needs an affirmative vote
from nine of the fifteen members, five of which must be the permanent members. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security
Council has the ability to completely or partially interrupt economic
relations as well as sea, air, postal, and radio communications, or to
sever diplomatic ties. Should these methods prove inadequate, the
Security Council is granted further power to impose its decisions
by force.
One of the resolutions that authorized force infringing upon
another country’s sovereignty was in July 1992 when the Security
Council unanimously passed Resolution 794. Resolution 794 created the Unified Task Force (UNITAF)—an American-led, United
Nations-sanctioned multinational force—to provide humanitarian
assistance to Somalia. This eventually led to Resolution 775, also
known as UNISOMII, which deployed an additional 3,500 personnel and included an arms embargo against Somalia.18
Instances where the Security Council acted against a state’s
sovereignty are not limited to Somalia. In 1994, the Council passed
Resolution 940 by a unanimous decision of twelve votes to zero in
response to the government coup and internal warfare in Haiti. In
keeping with Chapter VII of the Charter, the resolution authorized
an American-led multinational force to facilitate the departure of
military leaders from Haiti, and for the elected politicians to return
to a secure and stable environment.19 Some earlier examples include
the resolutions authorizing force during the Korean War and the
Congo Crisis of the 1960s. These resolutions show that despite its
general respect for sovereignty, the Council has exercised its peace18

U.N. Operation in Som. I (1997), available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/
DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm.

19

S.C. Res. 940, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (Jul. 31, 1994), available at
http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1994/scres94.htm (follow link and select
“Security Council Resolution 940 (1994)”).
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keeping and peacemaking abilities under Chapter VII at sovereignty’s expense.
When considering the current peacekeeping and peacemaking
missions in which UN forces are currently engaged, it becomes clear
that there is precedent for intervention in “any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”20 The tacit consent to the
Council’s ability to overcome sovereignty as manifested by membership in the UN indicates a modicum of agreement to this unique
prerogative of the Council. The recognition and acceptance of this
ability will be an important factor when considering extending the
Security Council’s authority over criminals at large.

IV. The Relationship Between the ICC and the UN
The drafters of the Rome Statute understood that the relationship between the ICC and the UN would be special. On the one hand,
they recognized that in order to prevent its proceedings from being
overly politicized, it must be a separate entity from the UN. Yet,
completely separating the ICC from the UN would greatly diminish
the efficacy of the Court. Therefore, a cooperative relationship would
be established between the two wherein the ICC would gain some of
the benefits of association with the UN without becoming one of its
organs. For this and many other reasons, a multilateral treaty rather
than a UN General Assembly or Security Council resolution created
the ICC. To ensure the cooperation between the two bodies, Article
2 of the Rome Statute directed that a special relationship be forged
between the Court and the UN by means of an agreement that would
be approved by the Assembly of States Parties to the Statute. This
agreement, named The Negotiated Relationship Agreement Between
the International Criminal Court and the United Nations, was adopted in October of 2004.
The articles within the Negotiated Relationship detail how the
Court is to be related to the UN. The relationship between the ICC
and the UN is generalized in Article 3 of the Negotiated Relationship, which states the following:
20

U.N. Charter, supra note 7, art. 39.
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The United Nations and the Court agree that, with a view
to facilitating the effective discharge of their respective responsibilities, they shall cooperate closely, whenever appropriate, with each other and consult each other on matters
of mutual interest pursuant to the provisions of the present
Agreement and in conformity with the respective provisions
of the Charter and the Statute.21
Subsequent articles expound upon this relationship, discussing the
use of facilities, exchange of information, financial matters, and other general issues of cooperation and assistance. Additionally, Article
16 of the Rome Statute gives the UN Security Council the authority to suspend ICC investigations or prosecutions for a renewable
twelve-month period. Consideration of such minutia shows the intricate level of expected cooperation between the two bodies.
One important aspect of the unique relationship between the
ICC and the UN is that it offers a way that the Court can expand
its jurisdiction. One weakness of the Rome Statute is that it limits
the Court’s jurisdiction to its signatories. Essentially, this makes any
country that has not ratified the Statute immune from prosecution
by the Court.22 However, the Rome Statute provides a mechanism by
which the Court may exercise jurisdiction over a state that is not a
party to the Statute. Article 13, section (b), states:
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a
crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if…a situation in which one or more of
such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to

21

G.A. Res. 3/1, art. 3, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/3/Res.1 (Sept. 7, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ICC-ASPASP3-Res-01-ENG.pdf.

22

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, The unlawful attempt by the Security
Council to give U.S. Citizens permanent impunity from international
justice (2003), available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Amnesty1422May2003.pdf.
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the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations . . .23
Such a referral comes by way of petition from the Security Council. It was such a referral that allowed the Court to investigate and
eventually issue a warrant for President al-Bashir. Sudan, not having
ratified the Rome Statute, would be immune from the Court’s proceedings were it not for such a caveat. In general, referrals from the
Security Council that extend the Court’s jurisdiction, like in the case
of Darfur, are issued on an ad hoc basis.
The ability of the Security Council to extend the Court’s jurisdiction is an important aspect of the relationship between the two
bodies. Still, while it stands to do much good by bringing those to
justice who might otherwise be outside the law, it also has the potential to be abused. Being the world’s preeminent source for the establishment and protection of international peace, the Council often
has before it several matters of great concern, some of which can be
issues du jour, such as the Kony 2012 phenomenon. Under pressure
from outside forces to take action, the Council may refer such cases
to the ICC for investigation. Yet, with no ability to do anything once
a breach of law is substantiated, the issue becomes moot and waits
upon some third party to champion the cause. By exploiting this aspect of the relationship, the Council can make all appearances of taking action while not actually doing anything to resolve the problem,
essentially washing its hands of the issue. In this sense, the ICC is a
place where the demands of justice are not met.

V. Proposed System
Under the current system, there is only one body, the United
Nations Security Council, vested with the power to override a state’s
sovereignty. Article 42 of the United Nations Charter gives the Security Council the explicit ability to take “action by air, sea, or land
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace
and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade,
23

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S 3, art. 13 sec. b.
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and other operations…of Members of the United Nations.”24 Though
some might take exception to the Security Council’s ability to take
military action, it is established in Article 4 that, “Membership in
the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which
accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the
judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these
obligations.”25 The acceptance to this obligation is further elucidated
in Articles 24, Section 1, and Article 25.
Currently, there are three ways in which an investigation can be
opened in the ICC: referral by a State Party, the Prosecutor acting
proprio motu, or by referral from the United Nations Security Council. This final method whereby an investigation can be launched is
covered under Article 13 of the Rome Statute. By convention, the
relationship between the ICC and the Security Council only works
in one direction. However, neither the Rome Statute nor the United Nations Charter contains any language that would preclude the
ICC from going to the Security Council for assistance. In fact, the
framework for this type of relationship already exists. Article 87,
Paragraph 6 of the Rome Statute states that, “The Court may ask
any intergovernmental organization to provide information or documents. The Court may also ask for other forms of cooperation and
assistance which may be agreed upon with such an organization and
which are in accordance with its competence or mandate.”26 Being
an organ of the UN, the Security Council is an intergovernmental
organization, and as such the Prosecutor for the ICC should be free
to go before the Security Council and ask for action to be taken to
apprehend a suspected criminal.
The wording of the United Nations Charter also supports such a
relationship. It is established in Article 34 that “The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to
international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine
whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to en24

U.N. Charter, supra note 7, art. 42.

25

Id. at art. 4, 24- 25.

26

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S 3, art. 87 para, 6.
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danger the maintenance of international peace and security.”27 The
addition of Article 35 which establishes the right of any Member of
the United Nations to bring a situation mirroring that expressed in
Article 34 before the Security Council strengthens the argument for
cooperation between the Council and the ICC when apprehending a
suspected criminal. It could also be contended that the Council has
a legal right to step in when signatories to the Rome Statute fail to
cooperate with the Court. Since the “Rome Statute obliges its States
parties to cooperate fully with the Court in its investigations and
prosecutions”28 uncooperative countries could arguably be in breach
of the law.
Should the ICC make such a petition, it would not be unreasonable for the Security Council to act. Under Articles 37 and 39 of the
United Nations Charter, the Security Council is authorized to take
action in order to maintain peace and security. Still, deciding to take
measures to apprehend an individual who is threatening the peace
does not necessarily require the Security Council to enter another
state’s sovereign area. Articles 52 and 53 of the Charter allow the
Security Council to delegate its actions to another group. This is
often beneficial because it saves time and resources, and is also preferential to the international community because nearby countries
often have a greater stake in the stability of their neighbor. There is
even precedent for such action. In its actions in Afghanistan, the UN
authorized the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force
to act on its behalf.29 Given the aforementioned articles of the UN
Charter, under the proposed system there appears to be nothing that
would prohibit the commission of NATO, the African Union, or another regional group to represent it in the effort to apprehend a human rights abuser or war criminal in one of the countries that is part

27

U.N. Charter. supra note 6, art. 34.

28

Report of the International Criminal Court to the United Nations for
2007/2008, ¶ 58, U.N. Doc. A/63/323 (Aug 22, 2008).

29

S.C. Res. 1386, ¶ 13 sec. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm (follow link and
select “Security Council resolution 1386 (2001)”).
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of such a force. Such an arrangement is also supported on the end of
the ICC.30
Such an episodic collaboration between the ICC and the Security Council stands to accomplish much good in the world. First, it
grants the ICC considerably more power to apprehend and prosecute
those accused of heinous crimes. Unlike the current system wherein
the ICC must rely on the state harboring the individual to turn him or
her over to the Court, this new system vests the authority to pursue
the accused on an international body with the established power to
enter another’s boundaries.
Furthermore, this system of prosecution is much less invasive
than historical examples of capturing and trying suspected war
criminals. The issues that plagued the Tokyo and Nuremburg Tribunals would largely be gone since the accused would be held to
internationally-agreed upon norms for what constitutes illegal behavior. Internationally-ratified charters establish the jurisdiction under which a subject may be apprehended, delivered, and tried, so
there would be little fear of vigilante justice by a conquering power,
as was commonly felt towards the trials in Nuremburg and Tokyo.
Perhaps the most pressing reason that a closer working relationship is beneficial is that it shows that there is no impunity for international war criminals. The Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC decried the
sad situation that results when the Security Council takes no action
on cases it refers to the Court:
When the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter, refers a situation to the Court as constituting a
threat to international peace and security, it is expected that
the Council would respond by way of taking such measures
which are considered appropriate, if there is an apparent
failure on the part of the relevant State Party to the Statute
to cooperate in fulfilling the Court’s mandate entrusted to it
by the Council. Otherwise, if there is no follow up action on
the part of the Security Council, any referral by the Council
to the ICC under Chapter VII would never achieve its ulti30

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S 3. art. 87 para. 6.
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mate goal, namely, to put an end to impunity. Accordingly,
any such referral would become futile.31
Lack of action on the part of the Security Council makes a mockery of international law and discredits all the bodies concerned with
international peace and integrity. Justice cannot tolerate the open
flaunting of such egregious acts.

VI. Practical Applicability
The International Criminal Court-Security Council petition system is practical for several reasons. Most importantly, there is nothing
in either the Rome Statute or the UN Charter that prohibits this relationship and the framework for such a system already exists. Also,
while it empowers the ICC, it does not give the body carte blanche
to prosecute whomever it sees fit. “The more states who support the
Court, the greater the Court’s legitimacy; [however] legitimacy will
not bring suspects to the Court’s cells and trial chambers”.32 Were the
Security Council to dispatch forces or authorize others to do so, it
would first need to agree on the measure. Given the gridlock brought
on by the opposing worldviews of the permanent members of the
Council, the use of such force would likely be an uncommon occurrence as it would require agreement among the many members. This
would serve as an impediment to politically motivated prosecutions,
though it would not completely eradicate the problem. Furthermore,
the Council’s ability to overcome this gridlock and agree on a course
31

Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Eighteenth Report of
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security
Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), ¶ 9 (Dec. 11, 2013) http://www.
icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-UNSC-Darfur-Speech-Dec-2013-Eng.pdf.

32

Darren Hawkins, Power and Interests at the International Criminal Court,
28 SAIS Rev. Int’l Aff. 2, Summer-Fall 2008. (statement of Professor
Darren Hawkins) (“[I]t seems unlikely that the Court would consign itself
wholly to an irrelevant but celebrated existence by baiting powerful states
or by expanding its pretended authority at the expense of actual suspects
and trials. To the extent that the judges and prosecutors desire to pursue
justice against deserving perpetrators, they will attempt to work with
Western states, not against them.”).
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of action would send a strong message to the global community that
the actions perpetrated by the accused will not be tolerated among
the international community.
This petition system is also practical because the Prosecutor most
often investigates those states currently harboring UN peacekeeping
forces. It would be no great leap to give permission to these forces
to apprehend the accused. Similarly, should peacekeeping forces be
deployed to a nation for an unrelated assignment, and in the process
of carrying out their mission come into contact with a national that
the Prosecutor desires to try, they would have the ability to deliver
him or her to the ICC for trial.
Furthermore, this system would not require any great alterations
to the status quo operation of the United Nations. Because the Security Council has the ability to designate others to act in its stead, it
would require very little work to hear the petition of the Prosecutor,
vote on the issue and, should it be passed, authorize an intergovernmental group like the African Union to apprehend the suspect. Such
an arrangement is ideal because while it gives the ICC more power
to prosecute, it also puts the power to act in the hands of either an
internationally-endorsed body vested with authority to override sovereignty or regional forces that are likely to be accepted within the
borders of a given state.
Yet, for all its practicality it must be said that this is not a perfect
system. Under this system there is little impetus for the Security
Council to encumber itself with more obligations. Simply because
the ICC can petition the Council does not necessarily mean that the
Council must hear it. There is nothing to prevent the Council from
demurring. However, the current relationship between the Council
and the ICC could be altered to require the Council to hear certain
petitions. Article 22 of the Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the ICC and the UN dictates how amendments may be made
to the Agreement. Under this provision an amendment could be added that requires the Security Council to hear the Prosecutor’s findings regarding any case the Council refers to the ICC. Though not
precluded by law, under the status quo relationship there is nothing
to impel the Council to hear the Court’s findings. While the Council’s right to bring cases before the ICC is explicitly stated in the
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Rome Statute and Negotiated Relationship, the right of the ICC to
petition the Council is only implicit. This proposed change resolves
the aforementioned concern of the Council, washing its hands of an
issue by sending it to the Court. Such an amendment would obligate the Council to give audience to a representative of the Court
who would present the results of the investigation. While this change
would not require the Council to take action, it would put the onus
back on the Council to do something about an issue it had already
recognized as worthy of action.
It should be noted that this system is not likely to make believers out of states skeptical of the ICC. Countries like the United
States and China will probably not experience a sudden conversion.
Furthermore, these and other permanent members of the Security
Council may oppose more explicit duties for the Council. They may
view this system, or an amendment to the Negotiated Relationship
allowing it, as an unnecessary burden. Another concern specifically
regarding the amendment is that if it were put into law, it would
make the Council hesitant to send future requests. Yet, the purpose
of this proposition is not to compel the Council to act, but simply
to facilitate a more effective relationship between the ICC and the
Council. Whether viewed through the lens of the Rome Statute, the
UN Charter, or the Negotiated Relationship, there is no persuasive
legal reason why the Court should not be able to petition the Security Council to take action or put pressure on the State harboring an
individual to relinquish him or her to the Court.

VII. Conclusion
The UN Charter and other agreements demonstrate how a petitioner-petitionee relationship between the International Criminal
Court and the United Nations Security Council stands to benefit the
international community. The framework is already in place, and
unlike the aforementioned examples of war crimes tribunals, there is
jurisdiction for this method of apprehending suspects. This method
would strengthen the ability of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court to try those accused of crimes against humanity
without creating a system that overrides the sovereignty of a given
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state in any new or untested manner. The UN Charter and the Rome
Statute in no way preclude such a relationship. Though it is not expressly established in either, a close reading of the two shows that
cooperation is entirely possible given the structure of each.
Adopting this system would lead to a safer, more just world. We
may consider the situation in Syria as a hypothetical. The use of
chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war is almost certainly a violation of the Rome Statute. As such, President Bashar al-Assad could
have been issued an arrest warrant by the ICC if an investigation
were to prove his culpability. Under the proposed system, the Council would have the ability to authorize forces to apprehend President
al-Assad and take him to The Hague to stand trial. Were this to have
happened, it is quite possible that much of the subsequent violence
could have been forestalled, sparing the lives and preventing the suffering of scores of individuals. Of course, this action would not be
possible without both China and Russia’s consent, which would be
very difficult to secure.
The actions of a state official, such as al-Assad, show the weakness of this system, namely, reliance on the Council to reach an
agreement. However, the difficulty of reaching an agreement does
not mean that progress cannot be made. When we consider the likelihood of the apprehension of a non-state official like Joseph Kony, the
odds of Security Council agreement and subsequent apprehension
increase tremendously. Kony, the Lord’s Resistance Army leader, is
responsible for a number of heinous crimes in Eastern Africa. Because Uganda ratified the Rome Statute in 2002 and Kony is a national of that state, he is subject to ICC jurisdiction for his crimes.
As a non-state official, the likelihood of political considerations obstructing agreement by the Council is very low; a country’s ties to
Uganda would have little effect on its decision to apprehend Kony
because he is not a representative thereof. Passing an agreement, the
Security Council could authorize a group such as the African Union
to conduct operations to find and arrest Kony. These forces would be
preferred because of their strong knowledge of the area.
Before this procedure could become a reality, it must be realized
that the special Rome-statute prescribed relationship between the
ICC and Security Council need not only work in one direction. An
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exploration of the legal structures of these bodies reveals no compelling reason why they could not work more effectively in concert.
Justice for the suffering is possible and immediate action towards
this end should be taken. Untold lives hang in the balance.

